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Lawyers Acting Badly, or Not?  Misconduct in IP Litigation: 
Recent Examples and the Issues They Raise 
 
Lisa A. Dolak* 
 
 
 Misconduct in civil litigation is not a new phenomenon.1  Nor is it confined to particular 
types of cases.  Because of their characteristic intensity, 2 however, intellectual property cases 
may be more likely to inspire bad behavior than other types of cases.  In patent cases, in 
particular, often much is at stake for both counsel3 and client.4  The potential outcomes range 
from a judgment for the patent owner, potentially including trebled lost profits,5 a permanently 
enjoined infringer6 and even an attorneys’ fees award,7  to a ruling that the asserted patent is 
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excellent research support provided by my research assistant, Alison Taroli.  I can be reached at 
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1 See Maurice Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 480, 484-89 (1958) 
(discussing judicial sanctions rulings from the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s). 
 
2 See, e.g., Hon. Elizabeth D. Laporte, Managing the Runaway Patent Case, 964 PLI/PAT 935, 938 (2009) (“The 
reasons for the intensity of patent litigation may range from the enormous economic stakes and competitive issues 
often involved to the lure of the heightened prospect of reversal on appeal when key issues are routinely reviewed de 
novo.”). 
 
3 See, e.g., Jerry A. Riedinger, IP Ethics Potpourri--Commonly Arising Ethical Issues in Intellectual Property, 947 
PLI/PAT 1257, 1272 (2008) (“Patent litigation often involves extremely valuable property, and high stakes, bet-the-
company issues. Attorney fees frequently exceed multiple millions. Success can lead a patent litigator to ever more 
lucrative engagements, while failure can materially hinder an attorney's career.”).  
 
4 See, e.g., id. at 1261 (“Much is at stake in IP litigation, especially patent litigation. The high stakes lead to bitter 
fights, lost tempers and a desire to win-at-all costs.”); ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS: A CONCISE 
GUIDE x (Quorum Books 1999) (“In no other area of civil litigation are the potential rewards for the victor more 
abundant or the penalties for the loser more catastrophic.”). 
 
5 As discussed, for example, in Shockley v. Arcan, Inc., 248 F.3d 1349, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2001), lost profits are 
available under particular circumstances pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 284, which provides, in relevant part: 
 
Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate 
for the infringement but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the 
invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court. 
 
When the damages are not found by a jury, the court shall assess them. In either event the court 
may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed. 
6 Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. 283, “[t]he several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant injunctions 
in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as 
the court deems reasonable.”  See also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-92 (2006) (holding 
that permanent injunctions are available in patent cases in accordance with “well-established principles of equity”). 
7 See infra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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partly or entirely invalid,8 or even unenforceable,9 with the patent owner ordered to pay the 
infringement defendant’s attorneys’ fees.10  And the complexity and potential intensity only 
increase when multiple patents and/or multiple accused products are involved.  The associated 
pressures seem, on occasion, to lead litigants and trial lawyers to succumb to the temptation to 
step outside the bounds of vigorous advocacy.11 
 
 The trial judges in each of the recent IP cases discussed herein wrestled with the issue of 
whether certain litigation tactics crossed the line between advocacy and abuse.  The decisions 
contend with a range of conduct, occurring at various phases of litigation.  In several, the trial 
courts’ decisions to sanction were reversed or modified on appeal or reconsideration.  
Accordingly, these cases shed light on a question which challenges courts, litigants and trial 
counsel:  when it comes to zealous advocacy,12 how much zeal is too much zeal?13 
 
 
SANCTIONING MISBEHAVIOR IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES 
 
 Parties and their counsel can be sanctioned under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 for “presenting” – 
including “later advocating” – pleadings or other papers that include allegations unsupported by 
law or evidence.14  As illustrated by the cases discussed below, however, recent IP litigation has 
generated significant sanctions litigation implicating other law governing misconduct in federal 
court,15 including some law specific to patent cases. 
 
 By way of background, discovery misconduct, such as unjustifiably certifying disclosures 
as complete or otherwise evading disclosure obligations, can be punished pursuant to 
                                                     
8 See, e.g., ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 936 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (affirming a judgment that the 
asserted claims are invalid for lack of enablement). 
 
9  See, e.g., Avid Identification Sys., Inc. v. Crystal Import Corp., 603 F.3d 967, 977 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (affirming a 
judgment of unenforceability for inequitable conduct). 
 
10 See infra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 
11 See Riedinger, supra note 3, at 1261 (“Because litigation – like most legal practice – is based upon an honor 
system, IP litigation produces great temptation to shave ethical corners.”). 
 
12 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble 2 (“As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position 
under the rules of the adversary system.”). 
 
13 Although sanctions for litigation misconduct are available against both parties and counsel under various 
provisions and legal theories, the primary focus of this paper is the conduct of counsel.  Accordingly, the decisions 
selected for discussion herein involved trial court rulings sanctioning counsel for litigation misconduct or rulings 
against parties for conduct involving the participation of counsel. 
  
14 Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b) and (c). 
 
15 Patent and copyright cases are in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, but even when not required to do 
so, most intellectual property plaintiffs choose federal court.  See, e.g., Steve Malin, Litigating Intellectual Property 
Disputes in Texas State Court, 12 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 473, 474 (2004); Note, How the Spending Clause Can 
Solve the Dilemma of State Sovereign Immunity from Intellectual Property Suits, 51 DUKE L.J. 713, 743-44 (2001).   
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Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(g)16 and 37.17  An attorney “who so multiplies the proceedings in any case 
unreasonably and vexatiously” can be sanctioned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927.18  And the 
federal courts also have the “inherent power” to sanction parties and counsel for bad faith 
litigation conduct.19  Attorney fee awards are available under each authority.20 
 
 In patent cases found “exceptional”, “prevailing part[ies]” may be awarded “reasonable 
attorney fees.”21  In addition, as noted below, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
                                                     
16 Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(g)(1) requires that: 
 
[e]very disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1) or (a)(3) and every discovery request, response, or 
objection must be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's own name — or by the 
party personally, if unrepresented — and must state the signer's address, e-mail address, and 
telephone number. By signing, an attorney or party certifies that to the best of the person's 
knowledge, information, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry: 
(A) with respect to a disclosure, it is complete and correct as of the time it is made; and  
(B) with respect to a discovery request, response, or objection, it is:  
(i) consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous 
argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law, or for establishing new 
law;  
(ii) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary 
delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; and  
(iii) neither unreasonable nor unduly burdensome or expensive, considering the 
needs of the case, prior discovery in the case, the amount in controversy, and the 
importance of the issues at stake in the action.  
 
Regarding sanctions, Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(g)(3) provides:  “[i]f a certification violates this rule without substantial 
justification, the court, on motion or on its own, must impose an appropriate sanction on the signer, the party on 
whose behalf the signer was acting, or both. The sanction may include an order to pay the reasonable expenses, 
including attorney's fees, caused by the violation.” 
 
17 Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 provides in relevant part: 
 
If a party fails to provide information . . . as required by Rule 26(a) or 26(e), . . . the court, on 
motion and after giving an opportunity to be heard: 
(A) may order payment of the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by 
the failure; 
(B) may inform the jury of the party's failure; and  
(C) may impose other appropriate sanctions, including any of the orders listed in Rule 
37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi). 
 
18 In full, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 provides:  “[a]ny attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the 
United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously 
may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred 
because of such conduct.” 
 
19 See Chambers v. Nasco, 501 U.S. 32, 45-47 (1991) (upholding the inherent authority of the federal courts to 
impose sanctions, including attorney fees, for bad faith litigation conduct). 
 
20 See supra notes 16, 17, 18, and 19. 
 
21 According to 35 U.S.C. § 285, “[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the 
prevailing party.”  See, e.g., Aspex Eyewear Inc. v. Clariti Eyewear, Inc., 605 F.3d 1305, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(stating “A case may be found exceptional in terms of §285 when there has been some material inappropriate 
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has recently held that a trial court may properly include litigation misconduct as one factor 
justifying an award of enhanced damages pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 284.22 
 
 
EXAMPLES OF RECENTLY SANCTIONED CONDUCT 
 
Attorney misconduct conduct in some IP cases has generated some eye-catching 
headlines, of late, including reports relating to sanctions in the form of enhanced damages, 
attorneys’ fee awards, and even potential jail time to punish aggressive tactics on the part of 
patent litigation counsel.  For example, trial judges have rebuked counsel for: 
 
 pressing forward with infringement allegations in the face of adverse claim construction 
rulings;23 
 “prolong[ing] the proceedings unnecessarily (thus unduly imposing upon the jury’s time), 
[seeking] to mislead both the jury and the Court, and [flouting] the governing claim 
construction as set forth by the Federal Circuit”;24 
 trying to prejudice jurors against the plaintiff patentee by asking them if they had “a 
problem with a company that puts its headquarters offshore on a Caribbean island in 
order to avoid paying U.S. taxes”, in violation of an order in limine;25 and 
                                                                                                                                                                           
conduct related to the matter in litigation, such as willful infringement, fraud or inequitable conduct in procuring the 
patent, misconduct during litigation, vexatious or unjustified litigation, conduct that violates  Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, or 
other major impropriety” and collecting representative cases). 
 
22 See infra note 39 and accompanying text.  
 
23 Mike McPhee, Judge Makes Lawyers Pay for Frivolity, DENV. POST, Feb. 25, 2008, available at 
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_8354619; Dan Slater, Judge Matsch Drops the Gavel on McDermott Lawyers, 
WALL ST. J. L. BLOG, Feb. 27, 2008, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/02/27/judge-matsch-drops-the-gavel-on-
mcdermott-lawyers/ (linking to the court’s order found at 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/matchorder.pdf). 
 
As discussed infra notes 127-32 and accompanying text, this sanctions ruling was overturned on appeal. 
 
24 Memorandum and Order, Depuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., Civil Action No. 01-10165-EFH,  
Feb. 25, 2008, available at http://pacer.mad.uscourts.gov/dc/cgi-
bin/recentops.pl?filename=harrington/pdf/depuy%20memordr%20attysfees.pdf; see also Richard J. Ambroqi, 
Experts Central to Two Huge Sanctions Awards, IPFRONTLINE, Mar. 28, 2008, 
http://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/article.asp?id=18015&deptid=7; Dan Slater, Attorney Sanctions in Patent Trials, a 
Trend?, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG, Feb. 29, 2008, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/02/29/attorney-sanctions-in-patent-
trials-a-trend/tab/print/. 
 
As discussed infra notes 136-37 and accompanying text, this sanctions ruling was overturned on appeal. 
 
25 Memorandum Opinion and Order, 02 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech., Case No. 2:04-CV-32-CE 
(E.D. Tex. July 10, 2009) available at  http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/ca/jail0714.pdf; see also Zusha Elinson, Patent 
Lawyer Gets Jail Time for Banned Question, THE RECORDER, July 14, 2009, available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202432231822&hbxlogin=1. 
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 “persist[ing] in improperly trying to equate [the patentee’s] infringement case with the 
current national banking crisis implying that [the patentee] was a banker seeking a 
‘bailout.’”26 
 
 Two of these cases involved sanctions for what the trial courts regarded as the failure to 
heed a prior patent claim construction ruling.  In both, the sanctioned parties were Medtronic 
companies, as enforcement plaintiffs in one and as infringement defendants in the other.  
Sanctions were also imposed on Medtronic’s counsel in one of them.  In both, however, 
however, the Federal Circuit reversed the finding of litigation misconduct.  In fact, sanctions 
awards have been reversed or modified in a number of recent IP cases.  Those decisions and their 
implications are discussed below.  But first, a few examples will show that recent cases have 
involved a range of conduct and sanctions awards. 
 
 
i4i Limited Partnership v.  Microsoft Corp. 
 
 i4i Limited Partnership v.  Microsoft Corp.27 involved computer technology,28 multiple 
complex patent law issues,29 disputes about the admissibility of particular evidence,30 and 
complicated damages calculations.31  The trial court’s decision is 65 pages long,32 but fewer than 
two pages are devoted to the issue of trial counsel misconduct.33  However, that misconduct was 
one factor in the court’s decision to award $40 million to the plaintiff in enhanced damages.34 
 
 In i4i, the court considered the conduct of Microsoft’s trial counsel to be relevant to 
whether i4i, the prevailing patentee, was entitled to enhanced damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284. 35 
                                                     
26 Memorandum Opinion and Order, i4i Ltd. P’ship and Infrastructures for Info., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., Case No. 
6:07CV113 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2009) available at 
http://blog.seattlepi.com/microsoft/library/20090817i4imemo.pdf; see also Debra Cassens Weiss, Microsoft Judge 
Chastises Weil Lawyer for ‘Bailout’ Dig, ABA J. LEGAL ETHICS, Aug. 18, 2009, 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/microsoft_judge_chastises_weil_lawyer_for_bailout_dig/. 
 
27 670 F.Supp.2d 568 (E.D. Tex. 2009), aff’d in relevant respects, 598 F.3d 831, 839 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
 
28 i4i, 670 F.Supp.2d at 573-76. 
 
29 Id. at 576-88, 603-08. 
 
30 Id. at 589-91. 
 
31 Id. at 591-95. 
 
32 i4i Limited Partnership v.  Microsoft Corp., No. 6:07CV113 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2009). 
 
33 Id. at 42-44. 
 
34 i4i, 670 F.Supp.2d at 595-96. 
 
35 35 U.S.C. § 284 provides, in relevant part:  “Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant 
damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use 
made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court.  When the damages are 
6 
 
After discussing a number of factors relevant to the issue of enhancement,36 the court stated “also 
favoring enhancement is Microsoft’s counsel’s litigation conduct, specifically during trial.”37  It 
then described a line of argument by counsel that began at voir dire and continued through 
closing arguments, despite the court’s repeated admonitions and warnings: 
 
Throughout the course of trial Microsoft’s trial counsel persisted in arguing that it 
was somehow improper for a non-practicing patent owner to sue for money 
damages. He further persisted in improperly trying to equate i4i’s infringement 
case with the current national banking crisis implying that i4i was a banker 
seeking a “bailout.” 
 
These improper arguments were made in spite of the Court’s warnings. 
Microsoft’s trial counsel began voir dire by asking the following question to the 
jury panel: 
 
So an example might be that somebody has a patent that they’re using not 
to protect a valuable product but someone’s copying, but because they are 
attacking somebody because they just want to try to get money out of 
them. So it fits, for example, with the litigation question Mr. Parker asked. 
So if somebody felt that – let’s take this case for an example. If somebody 
felt that the patents were being used in a wrong way, not to protect a 
valuable product but a wrong way, could you find that patent invalid or 
noninfringed? 
 
In response, the Court sua sponte had counsel approach the bench and outside the 
hearing of the jury asked: 
 
THE COURT: I understand that you just told the jury if somebody was 
using the patent not to compete, that that was the wrong way to use the 
patent? 
 
MR. POWERS: No, not to compete; just to get money, not to protect 
anything. That’s what I asked. 
 
THE COURT: What about protecting the patent? 
 
MR. POWERS: I’ll ask it that way again. 
 
THE COURT: I just – you know, I think you’re sort of misstating the law, 
and I don’t want to embarrass you in front of the jury. But I would 
appreciate it if you would clean that up. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
not found by a jury, the court shall assess them. In either event the court may increase the damages up to three times 
the amount found or assessed.” 
 
36 i4i, 670 F.Supp.2d at 593-95 (citing Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). 
 
37 i4i, 670 F.Supp.2d at 595. 
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MR. POWERS: I appreciate that. I will do that. 
 
Despite this admonition, Microsoft’s trial counsel continued to misstate the law 
and directly appeal to the jurors’ perceived prejudices. During opening statement, 
he stated that “we’re here because the bankers decided to achieve liquidity” and 
that “the banker cases are the ones where you don’t have a very successful 
product, and the bankers decide to try to get their money out another way.” Again, 
the Court sought to temper these statements with a specific instruction to the jury. 
(“The law recognizes no distinction among types of patent owners. A patent 
owner may be a competitor of an accused infringer, but it does not have to be. The 
characterization of a patent lawsuit as good or bad or as misuse of the patent laws 
based upon the status of the patent owner is inappropriate and should not play any 
part in your deliberations.”). Regardless of this instruction, Microsoft’s trial 
counsel’s improper statements were again reinforced during closing argument. 
(“[i4i] had a product that failed. They had a patent that doesn’t work. They’re 
asking for a bail-out. President Tyler [sic] didn’t give bankers a bail-out. We 
would ask for you not to give one here either.”).38 
 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit upheld that the district court’s decision to award enhanced 
damages in the amount of $40 million (on an underlying compensatory award of $250 million) 
and to include the trial counsel’s misconduct as one factor justifying enhancement.39 
 
 
O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co. 
 
 Counsel for infringement defendant Beyond Innovation Technology Co. Ltd. (“BiTEK”) 
also attempted to bias the jury against a patentee plaintiff, but wound up with a contempt citation 
and a 48-hour (suspended) jail sentence!40  During voir dire, the defendant’s attorney asked the 
jury panel “are there any of you who have a problem with a company that puts its headquarters 
offshore on a Caribbean island in order to avoid paying U.S. taxes?”41  Counsel for the plaintiff 
objected immediately, and the court scheduled a hearing on the issue following jury selection.42 
 
Following that hearing, the court held that counsel’s question violated the pre-trial order 
in limine, which read:  “Defendants may refer to the fact that O2 is a Cayman Islands 
corporation.  The motion [to preclude evidence regarding O2’s Cayman Islands headquarters] 
                                                     
38 i4i, 670 F.Supp.2d at 595-96 (court’s citations to trial transcript and jury charge omitted). 
 
39 i4i Limited Partnership v.  Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (agreeing with Microsoft “that it 
would have been improper to enhance damages based solely on litigation misconduct”). 
 
40 O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., No. 2:04-CV-32-CE, 2009 WL 2047617, at *2-3 (E.D. Tex. 
July 10, 2009). 
 
41 Id. at *2. 
 
42 Id. 
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is granted to the extent defendants seek to offer evidence relating to taxation.”43 It rejected the 
attorney’s explanation: “that he believed, by asking the questions in a hypothetical manner, 
without mentioning [the plaintiff], he would avoid violating the order”,44 and held the violation 
to be “flagrant and intentional.”45  It suspended the sentence pending the completion of the trial, 
and ruled that the sentence would be considered discharged if the attorney violated no further 
orders.46 
 
 At the hearing, the court reserved the separate issue of an appropriate sanction against the 
attorney’s client – BiTEK – and set forth its analysis regarding that issue in its subsequent 
order.47  Preliminarily, the court held that BiTEK, too, should be sanctioned, for “undermin[ing] 
the parties’ expectations to a trial by a jury selected from the panel summoned according to the 
regular process of the court.”48  The court set forth two goals it hoped to achieve via the 
sanctions: “cur[e] the prejudice caused by the violation and deter[] future litigants from violating 
the court’s orders in limine.”49  It declined O2 Micro’s request for the imposition of “‘death 
penalty’ sanctions”, citing the Federal Circuit’s decision in ClearValue Inc. v. Pearl River 
Polymers Inc., discussed below,50 and thoughtfully considered the suitability of a number of 
“lesser sanctions” under the particular circumstances of this case.51 
 
 The court rejected punitive or curative jury instructions as potentially prejudicing 
BiTEK’s co-defendants and noted that “such instructions would only highlight the overly 
prejudicial question to the panel.”52  Precluding BiTEK’s evidence would not suffice, as the 
other defendants – purchasers of BiTEK’s products – could and would be expected to introduce 
evidence (on the issues of infringement and willfulness) helpful to BiTEK.53  As for financial 
sanctions, the court declined to impose the costs of jury selection, observing that such a sanction 
“would effectively allow a litigant to buy a new jury panel by intentionally violating the court’s 
                                                     
43 Id. at *1-2 (italics in original).  
  
44 Id. at *2. 
 
45 Id. 
  
46 Id. 
 
47 See id. at *2-4. 
 
48 Id. at *2. 
 
49 Id. 
 
50 See infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text. 
 
51 O2 Micro, No. 2:04-CV-CE, 2009 WL 2047617 at *2-3.  
 
52 Id. at *3. 
 
53 Id. 
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orders in limine”, and “[e]ven a substantial fine,” because in high-value cases “parties might well 
have the incentive and the financial resources to engage in this type of conduct.”54 
 
 Ultimately, the court gave O2 Micro the option of proceeding with the tainted jury, or 
accepting a package of sanctions against BiTEK including the following: 
 
 Mistrial; 
 Severance of the case against BiTEK; 
 Restricted voir dire time and peremptory challenges (half as much/many as O2;) 
 Jury instruction that BiTEK received less time in voir dire because “its counsel 
intentionally violated a court order in the first jury selection”, necessitating the 
impaneling of a new jury; 
 Exclusion of BiTEK’s expert testimony on infringement, and 
 Payment of “all of the parties’ costs and attorneys’ fees involved in the first jury selection 
and . . . the plaintiff’s cost and attorneys’ fees in having to try the severed case against the 
remaining defendants.” 55 
 
The court’s discussion illustrates the special challenges associated with fashioning a remedy for 
misconduct occurring in the presence of the jury, particularly in high-stakes cases involving 
multiple parties. 
 
 
Commil USA v. Cisco Sys., Inc. 
 
 The conduct of a litigation attorney for infringement defendant Cisco Systems, Inc. 
reportedly recently prompted a Marshall, Texas, federal magistrate judge to offer to entertain a 
new trial motion on the part of Commil USA, the patentee.56   The attorney, Otis Carroll, is 
accused of seeking to play to potential anti-foreign bias by asking the jury to reject the 
infringement claim so that Commil’s President Johathan David “won't fly back home [to Israel] 
later this week with a sack full of Cisco's money that belongs to Cisco and its employees here in 
Texas."57  But more inflammatory was Mr. Carroll’s remark to Mr. David, who is Jewish, during 
cross-examination.   Mr. Carroll asked Mr. David if he’d met in Marshall with one of the 
inventors of the patent at issue.  Following Mr. David’s answer that the two had met for dinner at 
the Bodacious Barbecue restaurant, Mr. Carroll guessed “I bet not pork” regarding what Mr. 
David had eaten.58 
                                                     
54 Id. 
 
55 Id. 
 
56 Andrew Longstreth, Allegedly Anti-Semitic Remarks by Cisco Outside Counsel Prompt Commil Request for New 
Trial, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, June 24, 2010, http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202462963733#. 
 
57 Id. 
 
58 Miriam Rozen, Pork remark in patent case prompts magistrate to say he will entertain new trial motion, TEXAS 
LAWYER BLOG, May 24, 2010, http://texaslawyer.typepad.com/texas_lawyer_blog/2010/05/pork-remark-in-patent-
case-prompts-magistrate-to-say-he-will-entertain-new-trial-motion.html. 
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 Magistrate Judge Chad Everingham promptly issued a curative instruction to the jury, 
stating "Sometimes when a lawyer injects irrelevant information into a case it's because he 
perceives a weakness in the merits of his case. I don't know whether that's why it happened in 
this case, but you can consider that as you're evaluating the testimony and the evidence in this 
case."59  But after the jury came back with a $3.7 million verdict – far short of the $53 million 
the patentee had requested – the magistrate judge expressed concern about the effect of the 
remark on the jury, and invited the new trial motion.60 
 
 
Kellogg v. Nike, Inc. 
 
Kellogg v. Nike, Inc.61 is a fourth recent patent case in which the trial court was 
concerned about remarks of counsel during trial, but this time the statements related to the 
merits.  In this design patent case, the court had ordered in limine that “any argument or evidence 
that was inconsistent with the . . . claim construction would be irrelevant,” and gave specific 
guidance regarding terms counsel could and could not use to refer to the accused products during 
a hearing immediately before trial.62 In its order on post-trial motions, including the plaintiff’s 
request for attorney fees, the court cited several instances at trial63 in which the defendant 
“repeatedly attempted to reintroduce and reargue theories rejected by the Court in the claim 
construction order and the order on motions in limine.”64  According to the court:  “The conduct 
proscribed by those orders was clear.  Nike’s misconduct occurred throughout the trial and 
Kellogg preserved objections to much of the misconduct.”65  The court found that: 
 
Nike’s conduct at trial and throughout this litigation revealed a strategy calculated 
to misdirect the jury’s focus from the proper comparison of the patented design to 
the design on Nike’s accused hats to an improper comparison of the whole hats 
shown in Kellogg’s patent to Nike’s accused hats.  Nike made attempts to lead the 
jury to a product-to-product comparison that was contrary to established law and 
to the court’s instructions.  Nike was obliged to either accept the court’s claim 
construction ruling as the law of the case or to proceed with an interlocutory 
appeal.  Instead, Nike chose to pursue a strategy of distorting the court’s claim 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
59 Joe Mullin, Patent Litigation Weekly: Questionable Trial Comments in E.D. Tex., Take Two, THE AMERICAN 
LAWYER, June 4, 2010, http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202459283046. 
 
60 See Rozen, supra note 58. 
 
61 Kellogg v. Nike, Inc., No. 8:07CV70 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 2009). 
 
62 Id., slip op. at 3-4. 
 
63 Id. at 5-11. 
 
64 Id. at 19. 
 
65 Id. 
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construction and attempting to lead the jury to an improper interpretation of the 
claimed invention that would correspond to its proposed, but rejected, claim 
construction.66  
 
Nevertheless, the court declined to order a new trial on the ground that its “instructions . . . 
served to obviate any prejudice to Kellogg’s case occasioned by Nike’s lapses.”67  The court did, 
however, rule that Nike’s conduct – its “strategy of giving superficial recognition to the court’s 
claim construction rulings, while continuing to press its own interpretation of the claim”, 
combined with its “conduct in asserting and pursuing [its] claim of invalidity”, after having 
sought and obtained dismissal of its invalidity counterclaim on the eve of trial68 – constituted   
“[v]exatious conduct” warranting a finding of exceptionality under 35 U.S.C. § 285, an award of 
attorney fees and costs reasonably related to the invalidity claim, and a denial of an award of 
costs under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54 in favor of Nike, despite the jury’s verdict in its favor.69  Ultimately, 
plaintiff Kellogg was awarded in excess of $400,000 in attorney fees and costs on account of 
defendant’s misconduct.70 
 
 
St. Clair Intellectual Property Consultants v. Palm Inc. 
 
One of the more exotic reports, of late, of discovery-related misconduct appears in a 
Special Master’s report in a patent litigation involving St. Clair Intellectual Property Consultants 
Inc. and Canon Inc. over digital camera technology.71  According to the report, Canon had a 
consulting agreement with a third party, Mirage Systems, Inc., under which “Mirage agreed to 
help Canon establish that Mirage was the rightful owner of the patents at issue in the case, and 
not to assert those patents against Canon” in exchange for a payment (from Canon to Mirage) of 
$75,000, in addition to reimbursements for expenses and “‘lost time’”, for a total of 
$167,693.97.72  Yet in the litigation, Mirage was a fact witness.73  The report quotes the trial 
judge’s take on the arrangement, as follows:  “‘My interpretation would be possibly . . . you paid 
                                                     
66 Id. at 19-20. 
 
67 Id. at 20. 
 
68 Id. at 2. 
 
69 Id. at 22-23. 
 
70 Kellogg v. Nike, Inc., No. 8:07CV70, 2010 WL 323994, at *6 (D. Neb. Jan. 20, 2010).  The court held that 
plaintiff “Kellogg was a prevailing party with respect to [Nike’s] invalidity counterclaim.”  Id. at *1. 
 
71 See Marius Meland, Canon Settles Patent Case Amid Ethics Questions, May 2, 2006, 
http://www.law360.com/print_article/6378; Report and Recommendation Regarding Motions to Dismiss for Lack of 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction and for Jurisdictional Discovery, St. Clair Intellectual Property Consultants v. Palm Inc., 
et al., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37512 at 7-8 (D. Del. May 4, 2009). 
 
72 Id. 
 
73 Id. 
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the guy $75,000 to show up and say he owns the patents . . . it sounds like you paid him $75,000 
to come and say what you wanted.’”74 
 
Moreover, attorneys for St. Clair asserted that Canon improperly failed to disclose the 
agreement during discovery, and the Special Master concluded that that failure was “unjustified 
and fraudulent.”75  As a result, the Special Master recommended the revocation of the pro hac 
vice admissions of Canon’s counsel, as well as a ban on the participation of that firm in future 
proceedings in the matter at hand.76 
 
 
 
SANCTIONS AWARD REVERSALS 
 
 The above-summarized decisions illustrate that recent IP cases have involved a wide 
range of sanctioned conduct.  More examples follow.  However, in each of the following cases, 
the sanctions order was subsequently reversed or revised, either on reconsideration or appeal.  
Some questions raised by these decisions are explored below.  But first, the decisions are 
summarized. 
 
Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp. 
 
 The challenges of discovery compliance and of detecting non-compliance are well-
known.   The complexities, burdens, and opportunities associated with electronic discovery have 
multiplied those challenges.  Recent orders sanctioning parties and counsel for discovery-related 
misconduct in IP cases illustrate the power of the temptation to withhold damaging information – 
electronic or not. 
 
 The serious nature of the misconduct at issue and the magnitude of the sanctions award in 
Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp.77 were both eye-popping.  On January 7, 2008, the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of California issued an order finding that 
Qualcomm had “intentionally withheld tens of thousands of documents . . . requested in 
discovery” – documents which “directly contradicted a key argument advanced by Qualcomm in 
pretrial motions and throughout trial and supported a defense asserted by Broadcom.”78  It also 
found that “six attorneys assisted Qualcomm in withholding the critical documents by failing to 
conduct a reasonable inquiry into the adequacy of Qualcomm’s document production and by 
ignoring warning signs, which indicated that the document search was not thorough and that 
                                                     
74 Id. 
 
75 Id. 
 
76 Id. 
 
77 Order Granting In Part and Denying In Part Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions and Sanctioning Qualcomm, 
Incorporated and Individual Lawyers, Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 911 (S.D. Cal. 
Jan. 7, 2008). 
 
78 Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2010 WL 1336937 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2010). 
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Qualcomm’s document production was not complete.”79  The court imposed monetary sanctions 
on Qualcomm in the amount of $8.5 million,80 and referred the attorneys to the California State 
Bar for investigation and possible discipline.81 
 
 A critical issue in the case was whether Qualcomm waived its right to enforce its patents 
against Broadcom by participating in a technology standards-setting organization known as the 
“JVT.”82 In its opinion affirming the trial court’s finding that Qualcomm’s litigation misconduct 
was sufficient justification for its exceptional case determination,83 the Federal Circuit described 
the conduct at issue as follows: 
 
Throughout discovery, motions practice, trial, and even post-trial, Qualcomm 
adamantly maintained that it did not participate in the JVT during development of 
the [relevant technology] standard.  Despite numerous requests for production and 
interrogatories requesting documents relating to Qualcomm’s JVT participation 
prior to adoption of the . . . standard, Qualcomm repeatedly represented to the 
court that it had not such documents or emails.  On January 24, 2007, however, 
one of the last days of trial, a Qualcomm witness testified that she had emails that 
Qualcomm previously claimed did not exist.  Later that day, Qualcomm produced 
twenty-one emails belonging to that witness.  As the district court later 
discovered, these emails were just the “tip of the iceberg,” as over two hundred 
thousand more pages of emails and electronic documents were produced post-
trial.  The district court later determined that these documents and emails 
“indisputably demonstrate that Qualcomm participated in the JVT from as early 
as January 2002, that Qualcomm witnesses . . . and other engineers were all aware 
of and a part of this participation, and that Qualcomm knowingly attempted in 
trial to continue the concealment of evidence.”84 
 
On April 2, 2010, however, after granting the six attorneys “an almost unlimited 
opportunity to conduct discovery and to present new facts”, the trial court decided not to impose 
sanctions on the six attorneys, concluding that they “made significant efforts to comply with 
their discovery obligations.”85  It maintained, however, that “this massive discovery failure 
resulted from significant mistakes, oversights, and miscommunication on the part of both outside 
counsel and Qualcomm employees”,86 and summarized a number of those errors in its Order 
                                                     
79 Id. at *1. 
 
80 Id. 
 
81 Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 548 F.3d 1004, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 
82 Id. at 1008. 
 
83 Id. at 1027. 
 
84 Id. at 1009. 
 
85 Qualcomm, 2010 WL 1336937 at *1-2. 
 
86 Id. at *2. 
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Declining to Impose Sanctions Against the Responding Attorneys and Dissolving the Order to 
Show Cause, including: 
 
 “[A]n incredible breakdown in communication . . . permeat[ing] all of the relationships” 
among the involved Qualcomm employees, legal staff, and outside counsel;87 
 No evidence “that either in-house lawyers or outside counsel met in person with the 
appropriate Qualcomm engineers . . . at the beginning of the case to explain the legal 
issues and discuss appropriate document collection”;88 
 Outside counsel’s failure to “obtain sufficient information from any source to understand 
how Qualcomm’s computer system is organized”;89 and 
 The failure of any attorney to take “supervisory responsibility for verifying that the 
necessary discovery had been conducted . . ..”90  
 
However, the court found that “[t]hese failures were exacerbated by an incredible lack of candor 
on the part of the principal Qualcomm employees”, and that the attorneys “did repeatedly try to 
determine whether Qualcomm had participated in the JVT proceedings during the [relevant] time 
. . ..”91  Thus, it concluded that the attorney responsible for signing the discovery responses did 
so “after a reasonable, although flawed, inquiry”, and found that “the involved attorneys did not 
act in bad faith.”92  Accordingly, the court declined to impose sanctions on them under either 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 or the court’s inherent authority.93 
 
 The court’s recent order declining to impose sanctions no doubt comes as a great relief to 
the lawyers involved in this case.  However, for them the experience has been life-altering,94 and 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
87 Id. 
 
88 Id. 
 
89 Id. 
 
90 Id. 
 
91 Id. at *4. 
 
92 Id. at *6. 
 
93 Id. *6-7. 
 
94 Debra Cassens Weiss, After Sanctions Are Lifted, Qualcomm Lawyers React:This ‘Can Happen to Anyone,’ ABA 
J., Apr. 15, 2010,  
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/after_sanctions_are_lifted_qualcomm_lawyers_react_this_can_happy_to_a
nybody/ (quoting one of the attorneys assigned to the discovery responsibilities in Qualcomm, stating “[u]ntil this 
case I’d always been going through life pretty happy and successful, just kind of going from one goal to the next 
goal,” he said. “And it really derailed my path through life and kind of put me on ice.”); Ashby Jones, Sanctions 
Lifted Against Qualcomm Attorneys (After Damage is Done), WALL ST. J. L. BLOG, Apr. 7, 2010, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/04/07/sanctions-lifted-against-qualcomm-lawyers-after-damage-is-done/tab/article/ 
(noting, as to the decision not to impose sanctions, that “It all comes too late . . . for four of the . . . lawyers, who’ve 
since left big firm practice altogether.)”. 
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the saga should serve as a chilling reminder for litigation counsel of the seriousness of their 
discovery responsibilities.95 
 
 
ClearValue, Inc. v. Pearl River Polymers, Inc. 
 
 In ClearValue, Inc. v. Pearl River Polymers, Inc.,96 the Federal Circuit agreed that the 
plaintiffs and their attorney had engaged in sanctionable conduct, but reversed the non-monetary 
sanctions and significantly reduced the monetary sanctions awarded by the district court.97 Patent 
owner Richard Haase and his exclusive licensee, ClearValue, sued Pearl River and several other 
defendants for patent infringement and trade secret misappropriation.98 Whether the wastewater 
treatment polymers Pearl River sold had molecular weights over one million was a “critical 
issue” in the case,99 and the defendants sought the production of the results of any molecular 
weight tests the plaintiffs had run on Pearl River’s products.100  The plaintiffs objected to the 
request as burdensome and “seeking work product or trial preparation materials that are not 
discoverable under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”, but did not provide the defendants 
with a privilege log listing any test results.101 
 
 Ultimately, it came to light that the plaintiffs had tested Pearl River’s products, and that 
those products had a molecular weight of “substantially below the one million limitation” in the 
patent at issue.102  Further, the plaintiffs’ expert had reviewed the test results.103  Thus, no work 
product protection applied.104  And, the plaintiffs’ counsel, Gordon Waggett, had been a party to 
the email exchanges between the patent owner and the expert relating to the test results.105 
 
 According to the trial court, only the “‘ultimate sanction’” of dismissal of the plaintiffs’ 
claims was appropriate, given the critical nature of the withheld information and the fact that the 
                                                     
95 Cassens Weiss, supra note 94 (quoting a second Qualcomm discovery attorney, stating “I think the take-away is 
that this kind of thing can happen to anybody.”).  
 
96 560 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  
 
97 Id. at 1294. 
 
98 Id. at 1295. 
 
99 Id. at 1296. 
 
100 Id. at 1297. 
 
101 Id. 
 
102 Id. 
 
103 Id. 
 
104 Id. 
 
105 Id. at 1298.  
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information was suppressed for over a year and a half.106  It struck the plaintiffs’ pleadings, 
entered judgment for the defendants, and awarded the defendants attorney’s fees, costs and 
expenses in excess of $2.7 million incurred over the period of the violation,107 including under 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 and 37108, the court’s inherent authority,109 35 U.S.C. § 285,110 and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1920.111  
 
In so holding, the trial court implicitly rejected the attorney’s excuse:  “that he had a 
‘total disconnect’ with respect to the testing[,] ‘was sorry’ for not producing the test results . . . 
because he now appreciated he was ‘obviously wrong’ and that the results were ‘not work 
product’” and that “he was ‘rusty’ and had ‘been out of the litigation loop’ for almost nine 
years.”112  Undermining this testimony, in the view of the trial court, was the fact that following 
the email exchange between the patent owner and the expert, on which the attorney was copied, 
the attorney wrote to the patent owner and instructed him to “stop copying [the expert] to ‘best 
preserve priv/work product.’”113 
 
 Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit reversed the non-monetary sanctions and eliminated the 
monetary sanctions but for the $121,107.38 in attorney’s fees under Rules 26 and 37.114  It 
concluded that the conduct at issue was “less egregious” than discovery violations the Fifth 
Circuit had held did not justify dismissal.115  Consequently, the defendants were no longer 
                                                     
106 Id. at 1298-99. 
 
107 Id. at 1301. 
 
108 Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 provides in relevant part: 
 
If a party fails to provide information . . . as required by Rule 26(a) or 26(e), . . . the court, on 
motion and after giving an opportunity to be heard: 
(A) may order payment of the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by 
the failure; 
(B) may inform the jury of the party's failure; and  
(C) may impose other appropriate sanctions, including any of the orders listed in Rule 
37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi). 
 
109 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 
110 Under 35 U.S.C. § 285, “[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing 
party.” 
 
111 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920, “[a] judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs...fees and 
disbursements for printing and witnesses.” 
 
112 See ClearValue, 560 F.3d at 1298. 
 
113 Id. at 1299-1300. 
 
114 Id. at 1294.  Further, without “condon[ing] his discovery misconduct”, the Federal Circuit exonerated the 
attorney for co-responsibility for the remaining monetary sanctions on the ground that he lacked the ability to pay 
(id. at 1306) – a decision with which Judge Newman disagreed.  Id. at 1311 (Newman, J., dissenting-in-part). 
 
115 Id. at 1308-10.  The Federal Circuit reviews discovery sanctions decisions under the applicable regional circuit 
law.  Id. at 1304 (citing Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc., 290 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
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“prevailing part[ies]” eligible for attorney’s fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 and costs under 28 
U.S.C. § 1920, so those awards were reversed, as well.116  However, in upholding the district 
court’s ruling that the conduct of the plaintiffs and their counsel was sanctionable, the Federal 
Circuit specifically identified the violation (“they withheld test results reviewed by a testifying 
expert”), deferred to the trial court’s evaluation regarding the credibility of the patent owner, the 
expert, and the attorney, and upheld the court’s “finding that the failure to disclose was not 
‘harmless’”.117 
 
 
Medtronic Navigation, Inc. v. BrainLAB Medizinische Computersystems GmbH 
 
 In Medtronic Navigation, Inc. v. BrainLAB Medizinische Computersystems GmbH,118 the 
trial court assessed nearly $4.4 million in attorney fees, costs, and interest against Medtronic and 
the firm of McDermott Will & Emery (“MWE”), jointly and severally,119 “to enable BrainLAB 
to recover the reasonable costs of defending itself in [the] litigation after a defense should no 
longer have been necessary.”120  The court held that Medtronic engaged in vexatious litigation, 
justifying an award of attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285,121 and ruled that fees could be 
assessed against the firm under the court’s inherent authority, if not under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.122  
 
 The court described the misconduct as follows: 
 
After receiving the Court’s claims construction ruling, . . . Medtronic and the 
MWE lawyers had a duty to reexamine this litigation and make an objective 
assessment of the validity of Medtronic’s claims that BrainLAB’s products 
infringed the patent claims as construed.  They were obligated to accept those 
rulings as the law of the case and proceed with an appeal by requesting 
certification of an interlocutory appeal or conceding the [defendants’] summary 
judgment motions.  Rather than accept that the claims construction rulings 
stripped the merits from this case, counsel chose to pursue a strategy of distorting 
those rulings, misdirecting the jury to a different reading of the claim language, 
and blatantly presenting the jury with a product comparison contrary to 
established law and the Court’s cautionary instructions.  Additionally, they 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
116 Id. at 1310. 
 
117 Id. at 1304. 
 
118 No. 98-cv-01072-RPM, 2008 WL 4452137 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2008). 
 
119 Id. at *3. 
 
120 Id. at *2. 
 
121 Medtronic Navigation, Inc. v. BrainLAB Medizinische Computersystems GmbH, No. 98-cv-01072-RPM, 2008 
WL 410413, at*6 (D. Colo.  Feb. 12, 2008). 
 
122 Id. at *9-10.  
 
18 
 
deceived the jury into accepting the statements in BrainLAB’s FDA application as 
an admission of patent infringement.  Capping all of this was a closing argument 
that misdirected the jury’s attention from the focus of the case, carefully crafted to 
avoid the Court’s instruction.  That argument distorted both the evidence and the 
law, misleading the jury into a plaintiffs’ verdict.123 
  
Although the court recognized that it had erred in declining to grant the defendants’ motions for 
summary judgment,124 it clearly did not welcome what it described as Medtronic’s and MWE’s 
position “that the Court had the obligation to stop any trial conduct that stepped over the line of 
zealous advocacy[; and] that they should not be held responsible for what they were able to get 
away with during the trial presentation.”125 The court accused Medtronic and its counsel of 
capitalizing on the particular complexities of patent litigation: 
 
The conduct of Medtronic and its counsel constituted much more than a few 
instances of overstepping during a hard-fought battle.  This case involved 
complicated technology.  Patent law is complex and not intuitive to the average 
juror.  Parties and counsel have an obligation to refrain from seeking to take 
advantage of those complexities by employing misleading strategies. . . . 
Medtronic’s untenable positions and misleading tactics complicated the Court’s 
task of analyzing the legal issues.126 
 
 The Federal Circuit reversed on appeal, however.127  The court considered each ground 
the trial court cited for its finding that the case was exceptional under 35 U.S.C. § 285, and held 
that none could support that finding.128  It concluded that “[b]ecause . . . it was not unreasonable 
for Medtronic to seek relief in light of the court’s claim construction,” the trial court’s ruling that 
MWE should be jointly liable for the sanctions award under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 “a fortiori” could 
not stand.129  According to the court, “[e]ven if [MWE] had concluded that Medtronic's prospects 
for ultimately prevailing in the litigation were significantly diminished by the court's claim 
construction order, it was not unreasonable for [MWE] to continue to press its client's case in 
light of the arguments that remained available to it.”130  In so ruling, the court even cited 
                                                     
123 Id. at. *5. 
 
124 Id. at *4 (“In retrospect, [the defendants’ summary judgment] motions should have been granted, saving 
BrainLAB the cost of a 13-day jury trial.”).  See also id. at *3 (“What was apparent to defendants’ counsel and 
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125 Id. at *5. 
 
126 Id. at *9. 
 
127 Medtronic Navigation, Inc. v. BrainLAB Medizinische Computersysteme GmbH, 603 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 
128 See id. at 953-965. 
 
129 Id. at 965. 
 
130 Id. 
 
19 
 
authority suggesting that MWE was obligated to so continue.131  Finally, while respecting the 
trial court’s “judgment that counsel's use of the FDA submission evidence was improper”, the 
Federal Circuit held that such use “was not sufficiently egregious to justify the imposition of 
sanctions under the court's inherent authority”, citing the Supreme Court’s admonition that “a 
court’s inherent powers ‘must be exercised with restraint and discretion.’”132 
 
 
DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. 
 
 About two weeks after the above-discussed ruling against Medtronic, a different court 
assessed attorney fees (under 35 U.S.C. § 285) and a $10 million penalty (under the court’s 
inherent authority) against Medtronic for what it regarded as a similar abuse:  “[seeking] to take 
advantage of the technical and legal complexities inherent in [the] case.”133  This time, the 
Medtronic companies were defending a patent case, and the court cited their “failure to accept 
the claim construction governing this case,” adoption of a “defense to infringement . . . wholly 
based on an attempt to obscure, evade, or minimize the Federal Circuit’s construction of the 
patent-in-suit”,134 and attempt “to mislead both the jury and the Court . . ..”135 
 
The Federal Circuit, however, reversed the attorney fees and sanctions award, attributing 
the trial court’s finding of exceptionality (based on the litigation conduct at issue) to a 
misunderstanding of the relevant law.136  In overturning the district court’s ruling, the appellate 
panel distinguished between the mere assertion of a defense and the manner in which the defense 
is litigated.137 
 
 
Montgomery v. eTreppid Technologies, LLC 
 
 The conduct at issue in each of the cases described above appears to have been motivated 
by a desire to win the client’s case.  The sanctions in Montgomery v. eTreppid Technologies, 
LLC,138 on the other hand, grew out of satellite litigation apparently pursued to achieve tactical 
advantage in a dispute with the client’s former counsel over fees.139 
                                                     
131 Id. (quoting Mezibov v. Allen, 411 F.3d 712, 719 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[A]n attorney is ethically bound to make 
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132 Id. at 965-66 (quoting Chambers v. Nasco, Inc. 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991)). 
 
133 DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 534 F.Supp.2d 224, 227 (D. Mass. 2008). 
 
134 Id. at 225. 
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136 DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that 
nothing in its prior ruling precluded the defendants’ invocation of the obscure reverse doctrine of equivalents). 
 
137 See id. at 1339. 
 
138 No. 3:06-CV-0056-PMP (VPC), 2009 WL 910739 (D. Nev. Mar. 31, 2009), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, Nos. 
3:06-CV-00056-PMP-VPC, 3:06-CV-000145-PMP-VPC, 2010 WL 1416771 (D. Nev. Apr. 5, 2010). 
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 After attorney Michael Flynn withdrew as counsel for Dennis Montgomery in 
Montgomery’s dispute with eTreppid over Montgomery’s alleged misappropriation of 
eTreppid’s trade secrets and eTreppid’s alleged copyright infringement,140 the Liner Grode Stein 
Yankelevitz Regestreif & Taylor LLP firm (“Liner Grode”)141 and two of its attorneys, Deborah 
Klar and Teri Pham, stepped in to continue the Montgomery representation.142  The two key facts 
underlying the ensuing complications are that (1) Mr. Flynn sought “past due attorney’s fees and 
costs in excess of $635,000, and . . . Montgomery . . . did not wish to pay him”, so Mr. Flynn 
filed a retaining lien under Nevada law; and (2) the United States, which had initiated search 
warrant proceedings against Montgomery, had “invoked the military and state secrets 
privilege”.143  As a result, the presiding Nevada magistrate judge had set a hearing to consider 
Flynn’s withdrawal motion and issues relating to the return of Montgomery’s client files in light 
of the fee dispute and the government’s state secrets assertion.144 
 
 Meanwhile, knowing these facts,145 Ms. Klar and/or Ms. Pham initiated a series of 
proceedings and took other steps the court ultimately held to justify the imposition of monetary 
sanctions against them, Liner Grode, and Montgomery in the amount of $204,411, the referral of 
the two attorneys to the Nevada State Bar and California State Bar, and “additional sanctions” in 
the form of community legal service obligations upon them.146  Those actions included:  
 
 Filing “a complaint for preliminary and injunctive relief in Los Angeles Superior Court 
on behalf of [Montgomery]” alleging that Mr. Flynn’s refusal to turn over client files was 
unjustified and violated the California Rules of Professional Conduct;147 
 Filing a “notice of objection to [Mr. Flynn’s retaining] lien on the ground that the 
California Superior Court had jurisdiction over the matter because they had already filed 
[that] complaint”;148  
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
139 Montgomery, No. 3:06-CV-0056-PMP (VPC), 2009 WL 910739, at *25. 
 
140 Id. at *1-6. 
 
141 The Liner Grode firm was known as Liner Yankelevitz Sunshine Regenstreif, LLP at the inception of the 
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perform 200 and 100 hours of pro bono legal services, respectively.  Id.  
 
147 Id. at *8.   
 
148 Id. at *9. 
 
21 
 
 Submitting “an application for arbitration of a fee dispute to the San Diego County Bar 
Association [without] disclos[ing any] information whatsoever concerning the pending 
proceedings” regarding the client file issues in the Nevada district court;149 
 Drafting (for Mr. Montgomery) and filing a declaration falsely stating that Mr. 
Montgomery understood Mr. Flynn to be “licensed to practice only in Massachusetts”;150 
 Filing “an ex parte application for writ of possession in the Los Angeles Superior Court 
proceedings” including representations inconsistent with statements previously made in 
the Nevada district court;151 
 Submitting a “request for investigation of Mr. Flynn with the Massachusetts Bar 
Counsel”, where Flynn was licensed, without disclosing, inter alia, that Flynn had been 
admitted pro hac vice in Nevada;152 and 
 Continuing to pursue relief in the California court notwithstanding the fact that the 
Nevada court had “not only reaffirmed its jurisdiction over the client files, but also 
formally retained jurisdiction over the fee dispute”.153 
 
The magistrate concluded that the above-described conduct was the manifestation of a “litigation 
strategy to insure—through any means possible—that Mr. Flynn would never be paid and to 
crush him into submission in the process.”154  She found: 
 
[T]here is clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Klar and Ms. Pham acted in bad 
faith or conduct tantamount to bad faith with the intention to undermine this 
court’s orders for the improper purpose of obtaining a more favorable forum for 
resolution of the fee dispute and the turnover of the client files.  Ms. Klar and Ms. 
Pham willfully abused the judicial processes in this court and elsewhere, and they 
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150 Id. at *10-13 (emphasis in original).  This is important because Mr. Flynn had been admitted pro hac vice in 
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did so to delay or disrupt this litigation to gain a tactical advantage.  As a result of 
their conduct, Ms. Klar and Ms. Pham multiplied these proceedings, and they did 
so unreasonably and vexatiously, resulting in an increase in the cost of the 
proceedings to Mr. Flynn and a tremendous burden on the court to sort through 
this byzantine web of misconduct.155 
 
That was just the magistrate’s introduction to her sanctions analysis.  She continued for several 
pages, commenting on Ms. Klar’s “abdicat[ion of] her duties to the court and the attorneys she 
supervised by engaging in a consistent pattern of gamesmanship, misrepresentations, and 
outright contempt of this court and its orders”, and her “unrelenting . . . campaign to achieve her 
desired end . . . at any cost to her client, to her junior partner, to the Liner firm, to Mr. Flynn, and 
to the court.”156  As to Ms. Pham – the junior partner – the magistrate concluded that: 
 
[She] was so focused on her assigned tasks—to remove the fee dispute and 
turnover of the client files from [the Nevada] court’s jurisdiction—that she 
suspended her own independent judgment and failed to critically consider any 
legal, factual, or ethical impediments to her assignments. . . . As a result, [she] 
engaged in a consistent pattern of material misrepresentations and the omissions 
of material facts from her court papers, oral arguments, and bar complaints.  
Conveying half truths and only part of the record in matters is a misrepresentation 
and a breach of her ethical duties as a lawyer.157 
 
Finally, regarding the firm, the magistrate held:  “Ms. Klar was allowed to operate in the Liner 
firm unchecked and unquestioned . . ..  [T]he Liner firm acquiesced to or willingly carried out 
Ms. Klar’s litigation strategy”, and was therefore also eligible for sanctions.158 
 
 Subsequently, upon consideration of the sanctioned firm’s and attorneys’ objections to 
the magistrate’s ruling, the district judge reversed the sanctions order as to each “without 
prejudice to any further proceedings consistent with [the district judge’s] order with respect to 
Flynn’s motion for sanctions.”159  As to each of Liner Grode, Ms. Pham, and Ms. Klar, however, 
the reversals were not based on the merits of the magistrate’s findings that the conduct at issue 
was sanctionable.  Instead, as to Liner Grode, the district judge held that the magistrate had 
imposed sanctions on Liner Grode only under 28 U.S.C. § 1927,160 and that that provision does 
                                                     
155 Id. at *25 (citations omitted). 
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157 Id. at *29. 
 
158 Id. at *33 (holding the firm’s conduct sanctionable under 28 U.S.C. § 1927). 
 
159 Montgomery v. eTreppid Technologies, LLC, Nos. 3:06-CV-00056-PMP-VPC, 3:06-CV-000145-PMP-VPC, 
2010 WL 1416771, at *15, 22-23 (D. Nev. Apr. 5, 2010).  The district judge, however, affirmed the sanctions award 
against the party Montgomery.  Id. at *20. 
 
160 This is curious, because in apportioning responsibility for the sanctions award, the magistrate stated “Ms. Klar, 
Ms. Pham, and the Liner firm are sanctioned pursuant to the court’s inherent power and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 . . ..”  See 
Montgomery, No. 3:06-CV-0056-PMP (VPC), 2009 WL 910739, at *36. 
23 
 
not apply to law firms.161  The district judge reversed the sanctions against Ms. Pham because 
“the Magistrate Judge’s order setting the evidentiary hearing did not advise Pham that she may 
be subject to sanctions personally”, and therefore that the magistrate “did not provide adequate 
notice to Pham prior to imposing the sanctions in this matter”,162 and similarly concluded as to 
Ms. Klar.163  As of this writing, then, the issue of whether the firm and the two attorneys 
involved in this matter will face sanctions for their conduct in this case is unresolved. 
 
 
Wolters Kluwer Financial Services Inc. v. Scivantage 
 
 The trial court in Wolters Kluwer Financial Services Inc. v. Scivantage164 also imposed 
sanctions on two attorneys as well as their firm, although the order was reversed as to the firm 
and one of the attorneys on appeal.165  The relevant facts are as follows:  the Dorsey & Whitney, 
LLP firm (“Dorsey”) filed suit on behalf of Wolters Kluwer against Scivantage and four 
individuals in the Southern District of New York in March 2007.166  A confidentiality order 
entered during discovery provided that certain information, including the documents at issue in 
this case, “‘shall not be used [in] any other litigation proceeding,’” and that the district court 
would retain jurisdiction to enforce those limitations.167 
 
 After the defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff 
decided to voluntarily dismiss the New York action and to re-file in the District of 
Massachusetts.168  However, the Dorsey attorneys working on the case – Kristan Peters and Marc 
Reiner – did not mention the pending dismissal during a subsequent conference call with the 
court and opposing counsel, and Mr. Reiner mailed (instead of emailing) notice of the dismissal 
to opposing counsel after Ms. Peters instructed him to file the motion (during or shortly after that 
conference call).169  Ms. Peters subsequently filed a motion for temporary injunctive relief in the 
Massachusetts court.170  Despite the New York court’s confidentiality order, she included 115 
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163 Id. at *23. 
 
164 525 F.Supp.2d 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 564 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 
165 Wolters Kluwer Financial Services Inc. v. Scivantage, 564 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 
166 Id. at 112.  
 
167 Id. at 113. 
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pages of materials covered by that order with the temporary injunction motion in Massachusetts, 
and delayed in returning discovery material to the defendants.171 
 
 The defendants moved for sanctions, but then settled with the plaintiff, and withdrew the 
sanctions motion.172  Southern District Judge Harold Baer, Jr., however, was clearly not amused.  
He issued a 129 page order173 decrying the “erosion of civility” in litigation practice,174 detailing 
the entire (brief, but highly contentious) history of the case,175 and ultimately imposing non-
monetary sanctions, as follows: 
 
 Against Dorsey for (1) voluntarily dismissing the New York action and (2) using 
discovery materials in the Massachusetts action;176 
 Against Mr. Reiner for (1) “cancelling a deposition on the date the suit was voluntarily 
dismissed” and (2) “sending notice of the dismissal by mail but not electronically”;177 
 Twenty-four separate sanctions against Ms. Peters, including for: 
 
(1) A misleading statement in the complaint;178 
(2) Statements – “made in bad faith for an improper purpose” – at the 
temporary restraining order in the New York action;179 
(3) A letter containing what the court regarded as frivolous discovery-related 
arguments;180 
(4) A declaration in which, the court found, she had “use[d a] semi-colon to 
provide a misleading interpretation of [the emergency motions judge]”;181 
(5) Conduct (“attempt[ing] to create a false record”, and a “meritless” 
contention on the record) at a deposition;182 
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(6) Disclosure of “information from an ‘attorneys’ eyes only’ deposition to an 
employee of her client”;183 
(7) “[B]ad faith” threats of sanctions and contempt motions at another 
deposition;184 
(8) “At various times in these depositions, . . . refus[ing] to show witnesses 
documents from which she quoted, show[ing] documents to witnesses 
from across the table, refus[ing] to provide copies of documents to 
counsel, refus[ing] to allow witnesses to take breaks, and threaten[ing] to 
call security when opposing counsel stated his intention to approach a 
Magistrate with a discovery dispute”;185 
(9) A meritless motion for contempt and sanctions;186 
(10) Conduct “intend[ing] to mislead the Court by implying that [d]efendants 
. . . acted in bad faith”;187 
(11) Making “misleading and inaccurate” statements “to the Court that 
[d]efendants had failed to comply with their [discovery] obligations”;188 
(12) Making “misleading and inaccurate” statement “to opposing counsel and 
the Court” regarding her client’s discovery production “for the improper 
purpose of gaining an advantage by procuring [d]efendant’s discovery 
before [p]laintiff provided meaningful discovery of its own.”189 
(13) Making false statements to the Court regarding the availability of 
witnesses for deposition and failing to appear for depositions;190 
(14) Committing “a fraud on the Court and on the [d]efendant” by participating 
in a conference call with the Court in which “the subject of the scheduling 
of future depositions was discussed”, while knowing “at that point that 
those depositions would never happen” because the decision had been 
made to voluntarily dismiss the case;191 
(15) Copying documents the defendants had previously produced in discovery 
after the action had been dismissed “in bad faith, with the improper 
purpose of the intention to use them in Massachusetts”;192 
                                                     
183 Id. at 543. 
 
184 Id. 
 
185 Id. 
 
186 Id. at 544. 
 
187 Id. 
 
188 Id. 
 
189 Id. 
 
190 Id. at 545. 
 
191 Id. at 546. 
 
192 Id. at 547. 
 
26 
 
(16) Misleading the Court “as to her knowledge of the state of transcripts” 
following the Court’s order that transcripts be returned by a set date and 
time;193 
(17) “[H]av[ing] the audacity to order additional copies [of deposition] 
transcripts from the court reporter . . . in blatant and intentional disregard 
of [the] Court’s order . . . to return all the transcripts”;194 
(18) “[U]s[ing] the transcripts in a bad-faith effort for the improper purposes of 
gaining advantage (and expedient relief) in a new court after she had 
‘judge-shopped,’ and after she had gained extensive discovery without 
providing any discovery of her own, and in an effort to have that Court 
eviscerate the Confidentiality Order that this Court had entered to govern 
discovery produced in this litigation (which remained in force after this 
litigation)”;195 and 
(19) Sending emails to the Court constituting “a transparent attempt to 
convince [the] Court to wait on [ruling regarding transcripts in Dorsey’s 
possession] until, Ms. Peters hoped, the Massachusetts Court might 
eviscerate the Confidentiality Order . . ..”196 
 
The district court’s language obviously reflects tremendous frustration with the conduct of 
counsel.197 
 
 On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the sanctions against the firm and against Mr. 
Reiner – the junior partner on the case – could not stand.198  The court noted that voluntary 
dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41 is a matter of right under the circumstances of this case, and 
therefore that the firm was entitled to invoke dismissal even “to flee the jurisdiction or the 
judge.”199 It further held, as to the firm, that “nothing in the record suggest that the decision to 
permit the Massachusetts filing [of the deposition transcripts covered by the New York 
confidentiality order] was made by the firm in bad faith or for any improper purpose.”200  As to 
Mr. Reiner, the appeals panel ruled that the misdirection he employed when cancelling the 
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deposition in question was not sanctionable,201 nor was sending opposing counsel the notice of 
dismissal by mail, as “the rules do not make electronic service a requirement.”202  The court, 
however, affirmed the district court’s imposition of sanctions against Ms. Peters.203 
 
 
THE FALLOUT FROM MISCONDUCT AND THE RESULTING LITIGATION 
 
 The cases summarized above illustrate that trial judges and opposing litigants and counsel 
are motivated by a variety of concerns in imposing and advocating for sanctions.  Obviously, 
litigants sometimes pursue sanctions for improper or illegitimate reasons, such as to prejudice the 
trial judge against the opponent, or to intimidate or increase litigation expenses for the other side.  
But concerns about compliance with discovery obligations, jury confusion, respect for court 
orders, for example, orders in limine and on claim construction, and abuse of process are clearly 
appropriate.  For example, in each of Medtronic, DePuy, and Kellogg, the trial courts were 
concerned about the potential for jury confusion regarding complex legal issues.204  And, as 
noted above, patent litigators have also recently drawn the ire of courts for straightforward, 
transparent appeals to jurors consisting of statements completely unrelated to the merits, but 
clearly designed to prejudice the jury against their clients’ opponents. 
 
 Ensuring fundamental fairness is, ultimately, the responsibility of the trial judge.  
Moreover, the above case summaries can leave no doubt that the conduct of trial counsel in some 
cases warrants concern and sometimes sanctions.  Given this, and the fact that litigation conduct 
plays out within the purview of the trial judge, if not right before his or her eyes, it is only 
appropriate that decisions to sanction are vested in the trial court’s discretion.  It is notable, 
therefore, that reviewing courts have reversed so many of the above-described sanctions orders, 
including, in some cases, appellate courts applying abuse of discretion review. 
 
 Sometimes, sanctions orders are reversed on procedural grounds or because the trial court 
misapplies the governing sanctions law.  For example, in eTreppid, the district judge ruled that 
the sanctioned attorneys had not received adequate notice that they were personally subject to 
sanctions.205  And courts in IP cases have recently reversed sanctions imposed against law firms 
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under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 on the grounds that such sanctions are available only as to individual 
attorneys.206 
 
 But the sanctions were lifted in several of the above-described cases “on the merits”, i.e., 
because the reviewing court (or, in Qualcomm, the magistrate judge on reconsideration) regarded 
the conduct at issue as either insufficiently egregious (as in Qualcomm and ClearValue), as not 
unreasonable (as in Medtronic), or even as entirely within the rights of the sanctioned firm or 
attorney (as in DePuy and, in the case of the Dorsey firm and attorney Reiner, in Wolters 
Kluwer).  These reversals raise a number of questions. 
 
 
 Aren’t Sanctions Reviewed for Abuse of Discretion?  First, relevant fact-finding, for 
example on the issue of exceptionality, is reviewed under the comparatively exacting clear error 
standard.207  The decisions to impose sanctions and to what extent are reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.208  However, “[a] district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its 
ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.”209  
And the Second Circuit, at least, has held that sanctions rulings are in a category of their own 
when it comes to appellate review:  “when the district court is ‘accuser, fact finder and 
sentencing judge’ all in one, our review is ‘more exacting than under the ordinary abuse-of-
discretion standard.’”210 
 
 
 Are Reviewing Courts Too Tolerant?  To be sure, the “judge, jury and executioner” 
nature of sanctions rulings, combined with the very serious potential ramifications of such 
rulings for attorneys and law firms, justify appropriately searching review.  Nevertheless, it 
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seems fair to ask whether reviewing courts are sometimes too tolerant.   Consider these examples 
of conduct held not sanctionable in recent IP cases: 
 
 Cancelling a deposition under false pretenses to conceal the true reason for the 
cancellation, i.e., that the suit was being voluntarily dismissed and re-filed elsewhere;211 
 The knowing pursuit of a meritless lawsuit;212 
 Failing, during the course of discovery, to: 
- meet or “discuss appropriate document collection” with the client’s employees 
- “obtain sufficient information . . . to understand how [the client’s] computer system is 
organized”; or 
- take “supervisory responsibility for verifying that the necessary discovery had been 
conducted . . ..”213 
 
Surely there are limits to what opposing parties, counsel and the courts can reasonably be 
expected to tolerate when it comes to litigation conduct.  And the nature and incidence of the 
conduct at issue in the above-described cases – all of which occurred during the last few years – 
reasonably suggests that perhaps litigation counsel and reviewing courts are expanding the 
definition of acceptably zealous advocacy. 
 
 
 What About the Trial Judges?  It is difficult to read the sanctions orders discussed above 
without feeling empathy for the challenges trial judges encounter in the face of aggressive 
litigation tactics.  Some of these orders are very lengthy.  They reflect, at least in some cases, an 
enormous investment of work carefully reviewing the record and applying the applicable 
standards.  It must be very disappointing for a trial judge to have had to experience the conduct 
in question first-hand, along with all of the associated attorney skirmishing – all while trying to 
preserve the integrity of the underlying proceeding – only to have a reviewing court effectively 
declare that the conduct wasn’t so bad after all.  It is important to acknowledge the “wear and 
tear” that overly zealous conduct and sanctions litigation inflict on trial courts. 
 
 In what is perhaps a reflection of that “wear and tear”, some sanctions orders manifest 
apparent frustration on the part of trial judges.214  It is also, therefore, worth noting that judges 
are only human, and that sanctions proceedings are high-drama, high-stakes events that 
potentially evoke emotions in all involved.  Accordingly, the possibility that frustration or 
annoyance might have played a role in a sanctions decision also justifies careful review, at least 
in some cases. 
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 Still, the number and nature of sanctions orders reversals, of late, seem to merit 
consideration of whether/to what extent trial judges might hesitate, in future cases, to impose 
sanctions.  Perhaps motivated by such a concern, one member of the Federal Circuit Medtronic 
panel wrote separately.  In considering the potential effect of sanctions reversals on future 
deliberations by trial judges, Judge Lourie’s concurring opinion is worth reading in its entirety: 
 
I fully join the thorough opinion by Judge Bryson which carefully analyzes all the 
panel's grounds for reversing the district court's sanctions. 
 
However, the court's opinion should not be understood as in any way impeding 
the desirability and ability of district court judges to control their courtrooms and 
ensure that substantive arguments are reasonably based. 
 
Many patent suits are brought these days with little chance of success. Appeals to 
this court from summary judgments of non-infringement based on claim 
constructions that are affirmed here are testament to the frequency of non-
meritorious claims brought in the district courts. Whether those suits are brought 
because of poor and non-objective appraisals of plaintiffs' prospects or for less 
worthy motives I do not know. But district court judges are entirely justified, 
when they encounter frivolous claims and/or excessively hard-ball tactics, in 
imposing sanctions on offending parties. They are enforcing respect for the courts 
and the rights of innocent parties to be free of unjustified claims. 
 
In this case, there certainly were a number of instances during the proceedings 
below where the court felt that counsel had overstepped its bounds with their 
arguments. We reversed because, as tellingly explained by Judge Bryson, each 
incident had explanations that the panel believed were exonerating. But our action 
in this case should not be viewed by district court judges as chilling their taking 
charge of their courtrooms and ensuring that proper arguments are made against 
proper opponents. 
 
With those comments, I fully join in the court's opinion and judgment.215 
  
 
What Motivates the Lawyers?  As noted above, Judge Lourie posed several possible 
reasons why parties file patent suits that are unlikely to succeed.216  In issuing sanctions in 
Wolters Kluwer, Judge Harold Baer went further, offering his observations on what he believes 
underlies misconduct in litigation: 
 
While I am dismayed at the way in which many law firms today approach the 
practice of law, I realize that for the most part it is none of my business and 
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indeed not the business of the judiciary in general.  The fact that partners are at 
times made and retained for their rainmaking skills and not for their legal skill, 
that the number of billable hours is not only the alpha and omega of bonuses but 
that these hours—or at least the ones that count—often exclude pro bono hours, or 
that who gets credit for originating a piece of business can throw a firm into 
turmoil and prompt major internecine struggles, or that the bottom line has 
eclipsed most everything else for which the practice of law stands or stood to the 
extent that the practice of law is now frequently described as a business rather 
than a profession.  While decriable these are as I said really [sic] not my concern.  
Rather, it is the fallout from such conduct, some of which we witnessed here, that 
ineluctably drives some lawyers and some law firms to the kind of conduct that 
played out before me at this hearing and that then becomes the business of the 
courts.217 
 
Judge Lourie and Judge Baer seem to agree that whatever the motivations of the responsible 
parties, the trial courts have a responsibility to police court proceedings and to act to protect the 
integrity of those proceedings when confronted with inappropriate tactics. 
 
 
 At What Price, Fairness?  The magistrate judge in the Montgomery case concluded her 
Order Re: Motions for Sanctions by acknowledging the solemn nature of the court’s 
disposition.218  In further noting that “[t]he court has devoted many, many hours of time in 
reviewing the papers filed, reading transcripts of relevant hearings, listening to recordings of 
hearings, and considering carefully the facts and law before it”,219 the magistrate also reminded 
us of another aspect of the costs that attorney misconduct and the associated sanctions 
proceedings impose on the system – the diversion of precious court time and resources from the 
merits of disputes.   In some cases, of course, the resource drain goes beyond what the courts and 
the parties invest in satellite sanctions litigation.  When the conduct at issue imperils 
fundamental fairness, an entire new trial may be necessary.  Such situations not only prejudice 
the offender’s opponent; they also injure other parties whose day in court is delayed as a result, 
as well as the taxpayers who fund the court system.  Trial and reviewing courts must also 
recognize these consequences of litigation misconduct, and should more frequently acknowledge 
them in sanctions decisions. 
  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Even after expressing tremendous frustration and disappointment in the conduct of the 
counsel in the Montgomery and Wolters Kluwer cases discussed above, each of Nevada District 
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Court Magistrate Judge Cooke and Southern District Judge Baer sounded a hopeful note.  
Magistrate Judge Cooke expressed the “sincere hope that those subject to the sanctions . . . will 
never repeat this misconduct and that they will renew their professional commitment to abide by 
the highest ideals of the legal profession and the rule of law.”220  Judge Baer further took note of 
the reality that most lawyers conduct themselves in accordance with those ideals: 
 
On a final note, the reader should be clear that I firmly believe the sentiment in 
the Craco Report that “the actual level of professionalism brought to bear . . . by 
thousands of lawyers across the state, in court and office, day in and day out, is 
extraordinarily high.”  I am hopeful that by casting a ray of light on this 
anomalous and sanctionable behavior the public and the profession will be better 
served.221 
 
Judge Baer’s confidence in the majority of attorneys is no doubt well-placed.  Nonetheless, the 
decisions summarized herein should serve as sobering examples of how even intelligent, 
experienced counsel can get caught up in the heat of the battle that is modern intellectual 
property litigation, and the potentially devastating consequences of that conduct. 
 
                                                     
220 Id. 
 
221 Id. (citing Committee on the Profession and the Courts: Final Report to the Chief Judge at 3 (Nov. 1995) 
available at http://www.nycourts.gov/jipl/10-3-95.pdf ). 
 
